Google Agent Anomaly Detection flags 87% of carried-out agent hijacks, but misses poisoned memory
Google tested its Private Preview detector on five public agent-security benchmarks: strong on prompt injection through tool output, weak on poisoned memory, and it reports rather than blocks.
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Google says its Agent Anomaly Detection flagged 87% of the harmful instructions that an AI agent actually carried out across five public security benchmarks, but only 4 of 18 cases where the instruction was planted in the agent's long-term memory. The company published the results on 12 November 2026 on the Google Developers Blog. Agent Anomaly Detection is in Private Preview on Gemini Enterprise Agent Platform, and every figure below is Google's own, from a test it ran itself on benchmarks written by other teams.
It matters because the test measures something most teams building agents have not measured: not whether the model resists a prompt injection, but how much gets past the model and whether anything notices. Google's own numbers say the model alone is not enough.
Key points
- Google ran Agent Anomaly Detection on five public agent-security benchmarks (AgentDojo, InjecAgent, Agent Security Bench, AgentDyn and AgentHarm), scoring 1,774 sessions, with an agent built on its Agent Development Kit (ADK) and gemini-2.5-flash.
- Of the harmful instructions the agent carried out, the tool flagged 87% for review; it raised false alarms on 2% to 16% of benign sessions, depending on the agent's everyday tools.
- The model itself did not follow about half of the harmful instructions it read, and ignored or failed at about 30% of those hidden in tool output.
- Poisoned long-term memory is the clear gap: 4 of 18 such sessions were caught.
- The tool reports, it does not block. Google's advice is to stop actions before they run and use detection for what gets through. It is not generally available yet.
What happened
On 12 November, Nakul Javali, a senior software engineer at Google, published "How Agent Anomaly Detection scores on benchmarks we didn't write". The feature was announced in September in Private Preview. It reads an agent's traces and logs after the fact, adds no latency, and flags sessions where the agent acts outside its intended boundaries.
The post opens with the risk it targets. Every tool call pulls in text that someone else wrote, and whoever controls that text can try to steer the agent. OWASP ranks this, which it calls agent goal hijack, first in its Top 10 for Agentic Applications (2026).
Google's stated reason for using outside benchmarks is that security tools "tend to look good on tests their own team wrote". It ran each benchmark case through an ADK agent on the benchmark's simulated apps, with each agent first running at least 300 benign sessions because the detector learns what normal looks like for that agent. The benchmark's own Python check read the final state of the apps (for example, whether money left an account) and labelled each session, so a model did not grade the result.
Each harmful session ended one of three ways: the agent never read the instruction, it read and resisted it, or it carried it out. The headline figure is about the third group.
Background
Indirect prompt injection is not new. The benchmarks Google used come from academic work published in 2024 and 2025, and they show how long the problem has been measured.
- AgentDojo (NeurIPS 2024) offers 97 realistic tasks, such as managing email or booking travel, and 629 security test cases, according to its arXiv paper.
- InjecAgent (ACL 2024 Findings) has 1,054 test cases across 17 user tools and 62 attacker tools. Its authors found a ReAct-prompted GPT-4 vulnerable to attacks 24% of the time (paper).
- Agent Security Bench (ICLR 2025) covers 10 scenarios, over 400 tools and 27 attack and defence methods across 13 model backbones (paper). Google uses it for the memory case, where the instruction sits in the agent's long-term memory.
- AgentHarm (ICLR 2025) is different: 110 explicitly malicious tasks (440 with augmentations) in 11 harm categories, where the user asks for the harm directly (paper). Google ran 412 sessions from it.
- AgentDyn (2026) is the fifth. We could not open a source for it beyond Google's post, so we cite only what Google says about it.
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The numbers
Google's split of what happened to the agent is the useful part. The model itself did not follow about half of the harmful instructions it read. It refused three in four direct requests for harm, and ignored or failed at about 30% of the instructions hidden in tool output. For the ones that were executed, the detector flagged 87%.
By benchmark, the share of carried-out harmful instructions that were flagged:
Across all harmful sessions, including those where the agent never saw or resisted the instruction, the flag rate was 45% to 62%. That is the weaker number, and the fairer one if your concern is probing rather than success. In the 141 sessions where the agent never read the instruction, nothing happened and the detector flagged just one. When the agent resisted an instruction hidden in tool output, only 11% to 25% were flagged, because the instruction sits deep in a tool result and changes little in the agent's behaviour. In AgentHarm, where the request is in the user's own message, 55% of refused sessions were flagged.
False alarms depend on the agent's tools. On the three injection benchmarks, whose benign sessions are office tasks, 2% to 4% of benign sessions were flagged. On AgentHarm it was 16%, because the benign tasks there are twins of the harmful ones: they post to social media, run terminal commands and download files.
Results by app were mostly strong: in 8 of the 11 apps, at least 95% of carried-out harmful instructions were flagged. The lowest was AgentDojo's Slack app at 63%, where many instructions ask for one small action, such as a page visit, that looks like normal browsing.
The history requirement shows up too. On AgentDyn the detector flagged 33% of carried-out harmful instructions when each agent had about 220 benign sessions, and 99% with 360:
| % | |
|---|---|
| About 220 | 33 |
| About 360 | 99 |
Source: Google Developers Blog, 12 November 2026
How it works
Agent Anomaly Detection works on the agent's traces and logs, so it needs complete telemetry: Google says to enable ADK tracing and logging, including prompt and response content. It analyses sessions asynchronously, which is why it adds no latency and also why it cannot stop anything. Its findings also appear in Security Command Center. Four of its five threat categories align with the OWASP agentic Top 10, and Google grades each OWASP category on what the study showed. It says public benchmarks concentrate on goal hijack and tool misuse, so its evidence is strongest there, and it found no public benchmarks with labelled traces for cascading failures or identity and privilege abuse.
What it means
For teams building agents, the main lesson is structural. A detector that flags most of what slips past the model is a second layer, not a substitute for limiting what the agent can do. Google's own list says as much: screen untrusted content (it names Model Armor), block risky tool calls before they run with Semantic Governance Policy (in Preview), require human approval for payments, outbound email and data sharing, limit each agent's tools, and review what gets through, routing Critical and High findings to the incident team.
For anyone comparing vendors, the post is a template. A vendor that reports results on outside benchmarks, shows the false-alarm rate next to the catch rate, and names its gaps is easier to evaluate than one that quotes a single accuracy figure. It also shows how a headline number hides structure: 87% is of carried-out instructions, while 45% to 62% is of all harmful sessions.
What we don't know yet
- Independent replication. Google ran, scored and published this itself. We found no outside confirmation.
- Newer models and real traffic. The test used one agent model, gemini-2.5-flash, on simulated apps. Google says benign tasks in the benchmarks are likely simpler than production traffic, so your false-alarm rate can differ. We have no figures for newer models.
- Missing results. Agent Anomaly Detection returned no result for about 6% of sessions. Counting those as misses lowers the overall rates by 1 to 2 points, according to Google.
- Poisoned memory. 4 of 18 is a very small sample. Google lists better detection as work in progress, without a date.
- Availability and price. It is in Private Preview, with access by request; we found no general-availability date or pricing.
What to watch next
Watch for the memory-poisoning fix, which Google lists among its next steps along with reporting resisted attempts at lower severity and catching small actions that reach an untrusted destination. Watch also for shared benchmarks with labelled traces for cascading failures and privilege abuse, which Google asks the field to build, and for any outside team that reruns these benchmarks against the same product or its rivals.
Sources
- How Agent Anomaly Detection scores on benchmarks we didn't write, Google Developers Blog, 12 November 2026 (primary source)
- OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications for 2026, OWASP Gen AI Security Project
- AgentDojo, InjecAgent, Agent Security Bench and AgentHarm, arXiv
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